FLAME University


Learning from some of the best minds in education and in the industry
Prof. Rakesh Chaturvedi
Associate Professor - Economics
Email: rakesh.chaturvedi@flame.edu.in
PhD in Economics from Pennsylvania State University, USA, and Masters degree in Economics from Delhi School of Economics at Delhi University

Rakesh Chaturvedi is an Associate Professor of Economics at FLAME University. He received his PhD in Economics from Pennsylvania State University, USA, and Masters degree in Economics from Delhi School of Economics at Delhi University. He joined FLAME University with over eight years of cumulative teaching experience at universities like Indraprastha Institute of Information Technology (IIIT) Delhi, Indian Institute of Management (IIM) Udaipur, and Delhi School of Economics at Delhi University. 

His research interests are in the broad areas of Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory and Mechanism Design. His published work uses mathematical models of bargaining, trade and markets to derive equilibrium predictions. He is interested in both theoretical foundations of economics and game theory as well as empirically motivated theoretical modeling for applied work in economics.  His work on bargaining theory provides a strategic model for a cooperative solution that is a synthesis of the classical solutions of the core and the Nash bargaining solution. In recent work, he has established connections, hitherto unknown, between the classical bargaining solutions given by John Nash and Howard Raiffa using strategic bargaining models. In work that is closer to mechanism design, in a series of papers, he has studied the economic problem of designing mechanisms for trading perfect complements. His work looks closely at the holdout problem that arises in such settings, and also explores auction-like trading mechanisms that help mitigate the holdout problem. He has also collaborated with communication researchers who find a game theoretic framework useful in studying decentralized network transmission that enable efficient spectrum use. 

Rakesh has taught courses in Game Theory, Contract Theory, Market Design, Microeconomic Theory, Convex Optimization, Markov Decision Processes. He also has a keen interest in Corporate Finance and Money and Banking. 


  •  Chaturvedi R. and Pandey A., Double auction for trading perfect complements, Journal of Public Economic Theory, February 2024, Vol. 26(1), 12672

  •  Chaturvedi R., Cost of efficiency in trading perfect complements, Economics Letters, September 2023, Vol. 230, 111236

  •  Chaturvedi R., Stability and efficiency in a model of production and pillage, Indian Economic Review, 2021, Vol. 56(2), pp. 313-333

  •  Chaturvedi R., Dutta S. and Kanjilal K., An Economic Model of the Last-Mile Internet, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, November 2021, Vol. 191, pp. 620-638

  •  Chaturvedi R. and Kanjilal K., Experimental analysis of a land assembly mechanism, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, April 2021, Vol. 91, pp. 101680

  •  Chaturvedi R., Fairness and partial coercion in land assembly, Games and Economic Behavior, March 2020, Vol. 120, pp. 325--335. 

  •  Chaturvedi R., Efficient coalitional bargaining with noncontingent offers, Games and Economic Behavior,  November 2016, Vol. 100, pp. 125--141. 

  •  Gopal S., Kaul S.K., Chaturvedi R. and Roy S., Coexistence of Age and Throughput Optimizing Networks: A Spectrum Sharing Game, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, August 2021, Vol 29(4), pp. 1494-1508

  •  Gopal S., Kaul S.K. and Chaturvedi R., Coexistence of Age and Throughput Optimizing Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach, 2019 IEEE, 30th Annual Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications: Track 3: Mobile and Wireless Networks.

  •  Gopal S., Kaul S.K., Chaturvedi R. and Roy S.,  A Non-Cooperative Multiple Access Game for Timely Updates, IEEE INFOCOM 2020, IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops.