FACULTY
Prof. Jaideep Roy
Jaideep Roy is Professor of Economics at the Department of Economics, University of Bath. Globally recognised as a leading scholar in political economy, his work spans economic theory, public policy, game theory, and behavioural and experimental economics, with a particular focus on how information, incentives, and morality shape democratic institutions and markets. He also maintains a strong engagement with philosophy, reflected in his publications on moral reasoning and Kantian ethics, including a forthcoming paper in Synthese, one of the world's foremost philosophy journals.
Professor Roy holds a PhD in Economics from Universidad Carlos III Madrid, completed with an exchange fellowship at the Center for Game Theory, SUNY Stony Brook, and an MA from the Delhi School of Economics. He began his academic career with a postdoctoral fellowship at the University of Copenhagen before holding research or teaching appointments at leading institutions including the Trinity College Dublin, the University of Birmingham, London School of Economics, and University of Surrey.
His research has appeared in the discipline's most prestigious outlets, including the American Economic Review, International Economic Review, Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Development Economics, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisation, Economic Theory, Social Choice and Welfare and Economics and Philosophy. More recently, his research has turned to the political economy of automation and artificial intelligence, with two leading articles in the Journal of Development Economics and Games and Economic Behavior examining how electoral incentives interact with technological change in the workplace.
Research
- Universalization of pro-honesty maxims and temptation to lie for a moral cause: the Kant Rousseau Dilemma (with Andrew Samuel) – Synthese (2026), Volume 208, article number 36.
- Electoral politics over automation in a dual economy (with Bibhas Saha) – Journal of Development Economics (2026), 179, pp. 1-15.
- Democratic regulation of AI in the workplace (with Bibhas Saha) - Games and Economics Behavior (2025), 125, pp. 113-132.
- Violation of land use regulations for allotment gardens: The case of Warsaw, Poland (with Grazyna Wiejak-Roy and Andrew Smit) - Land Use Policy (2025), 158, 107728.
- Kantian imperatives on public goods networks (with Sambit Mohanty and Mallikarjuna Rao) – Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, (2024), 224, pp. 194-214.
- Individual versus Group Morality: the role of Information (joint with Sambit Mohanty), Economics and Philosophy, (2025), 41(2), pp. 1-24.
- Responsive Democracy and Commercial Media (joint with Saptarshi Ghosh, Nidhi Jain, Cesar Martinelli), Economics Letters (2023), 222; 110961.
- Institutional imperfections and buyer induced holdout in land acquisition (with Sreeparna Saha, Prabal Roy Chowdhury and Grazyna Wiejak-Roy), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (2021), 177(3), pp. 261-298.
- Learning versus habit: optimal lockdown for disease containment (with S. Bandyopadhyay, K. Chatterjee and K. Das) – Journal of Mathematical Economics - Special Issue on Covid19 Pandemic (2021), 93, pp. 1-12.
- Expert Captured Democracy (with A. Chakraborty & P. Ghosh) – American Economic Review (2020), 110(6), pp. 1713-51.
- Extremist Platforms: Political Consequences Oof Profit-Seeking Media (with Kalyan Chatterjee and Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay) - International Economic Review (2020), 61, pp. 1173-1193.
- Majoritarian preference, utilitarian welfare, and public information in Cournot oligopoly (with Randy Silvers and CJ Sun) – Games and Economic Behavior (2019), 116, pp. 269-288.
- Random Settlement Arbitration and the Generalised Nash Solution: The One shot and Infinite Horizon Cases (Kang Rong and Nejat Anbarci), Economic Theory (2019), 68, pp. 21-52.
- Aid and Terrorism: a dynamic contracts approach with interlinked moral hazard (with P. Roy Chowdhury) - Indian Growth and Development Review (2019), 13(2), pp. 415-448.
- Double Auctions with No-Loss Constrained Traders (with Nejat Anbarci) - Theory and Decision (2018), 84, pp. 1-9.
- Information Control in Reputational Cheap Talk (with Saptarshi P. Ghosh and Nejat Anbarci) - Games and Economic Behavior (2017), 106, pp. 153-160.
- Strategic Dissent in the Hotelling-Down model with sequential entry and private information (with S. Bandyopadhyay, K. Chatterjee and M. Bhalla), Research in Economics (2017), 71(1), pp. 51-66.
- Cycles in public opinion and the dynamics of stable party systems (with Sandro Brusco), Games and Economic Behavior (2016), 100(C), pp. 413-430.
- Committees with Leaks (joint with Saptarshi Ghosh), Games and Economic Behavior (2015), 90, pp. 207-214.
- Hotelling-Downs Competition when voters have an option to contest (joint with Marcin Dziubinski), Journal of Public Economic Theory (2013), 15(4), pp. 620-653.
- Hotelling-Downs Model of Electoral Competition with Runoff Voting (joint with Sandro Brusco and Marcin Dziubinski), Games and Economic Behavior (2012), 74(2), pp. 447-467.
- Popularity of Reinforcement-Based and Belief-Based Learning Models: An Evolutionary approach (joint with Marcin Dziubinski), Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (2012), 36(3), pp. 433- 454.
- Electoral Competition in 2-dimensional Ideology Space with Uni-dimensional Commitment (joint with M. Dziubinski), Social Choice and Welfare (2011), 36(1), pp. 1-24.
- Aggregate Uncertainty in the Citizen-Candidate Model Yields Extremist Parties (joint with Sandro Brusco), Social Choice and Welfare (2011), 36(1), pp. 83-104.
- Ill-defined versus Precise Pre-play communication in the Travellers’ Dilemma (joint with E. Dechenaux and S. Chakravarty), Southern Economic Journal (2010), 77(2), pp. 351-368.
- Public-private partnership in Microfinance: Should NGO Involvement be Restricted? (joint with P. Roy Chowdhury), Journal of Development Economics (2009), 90(2), pp. 200-208.
- A location Game on Disjoint Circles (joint with D. Datta and M. Dziubinski), International Game Theory Review (2009), 11(4), pp. 391-406.
- Recursive Expected Utility and the separation of attitudes towards risk and ambiguity: an experimental study (joint with S. Chakraborty), Theory and Decision (2009), 66; pp. 199 -228.
- Punishment Path and Cartel size (joint with R. Rothschild), Research in Economics, (2007), 61(4), pp. 218-223.
- The Tenancy Ladder Revisited, The Indian Economic Journal, (2007), 54(4), pp. 74-88.
- When Aspiring and Rational Agents strive to Coordinate, International Game Theory Review, (2007), 9(3), pp. 461-475.
- Learning in Games with Bounded Memory, Control and Cybernetics, (2006), 35(2), pp. 1-25.
- Impossibility of strategy-proofness with coalition formation under Transferable Utility (joint with H. Sosnowska), (2006) in T. Trzaskalik edited, Multiple Criteria Decision Making, Scientific Publications.
- Stochastic Dominance, Optimism and Investment, (joint with D. Datta), Journal of Insurance and Risk Management (2004), 2(4).
- When scrutiny reduces signalling incentives, (joint with D. Datta), Arthaniti, (2003), II(1-2).
- Strategic Hazard, (joint with D. Datta), Journal of Insurance and Risk Management, (2003), 1(4).
- When Vagueness Induces Indirect Competition: Strategic Incompleteness of Contracts, (joint with K. Serfes), Economic Theory, (2002), 20(3), pp. 603-621.
- Inter- temporal Discounting and Tenurial Contracts, (joint with K. Serfes), Journal of Development Economics (2001), 64, pp. 417-436.