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UID:819a1cb7014b1163836eb78e564c8689
CATEGORIES:Lecture / Reading / Talk
CREATED:20211120T121116
SUMMARY:“Different Strokes for Different Folks: Incentive Contract Structure and Performance of Healthcare Providers"- A talk by Dr. Manoj Mohanan
DESCRIPTION:“Different Strokes for Different Folks: Incentive Contract Structure and Pe
 rformance of Healthcare Providers".\nDr. Manoj Mohanan\nAssociate Professor
 , Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University.\nThe Centre for Exper
 imental Social Sciences (CESS) Nuffield - FLAME University is pleased to ho
 st Dr. Manoj Mohanan, Associate Professor at the Sanford School of Public P
 olicy at Duke University. Dr Mohanan will be giving a talk titled “Differen
 t Strokes for Different Folks: Incentive Contract Structure and Performance
  of Healthcare Providers".\nAbstract:\nA central issue in designing perform
 ance incentive contracts is whether to reward the production of outputs ver
 sus the use of inputs: the former rewards efficiency and innovation in prod
 uction, while the latter imposes less risk on agents. Agents with varying l
 evels of skill may perform better under different contracts as well – more 
 skilled workers may be better able to innovate, for example. We study these
  issues empirically through an experiment enabling us to observe and verify
  outputs (health outcomes) and inputs (adherence to recommended medical tre
 atment) in Indian maternity care. We find that both output and input incent
 ive contracts achieved comparable reductions in post-partum hemorrhage rate
 s, the dimension of maternity care most sensitive to provider behaviour and
  the largest cause of maternal mortality. Interestingly, and in line with t
 heory, providers with advanced qualifications performed better and used new
  strategies under output incentives, while under input incentives, provider
 s with and without advanced qualifications performed equally.\nBio:\nAs an 
 applied microeconomist working in health policy/global health, Dr. Mohanan'
 s research focuses on topics including: performance-based contracts, measur
 ement of provider quality and performance, social franchising and social ac
 countability/monitoring. He also studies the role of subjective expectation
 s/beliefs in healthcare behaviour.\nSeveral of these projects feature field
  experiments and policy interventions/evaluations. He is currently working 
 on research projects in India, Kenya and China.\n
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:<p>“Different Strokes for Different Folks: Incentive Contract Structure and
  Performance of Healthcare Providers".<br />Dr. Manoj Mohanan<br />Associat
 e Professor, Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University.</p><p>The 
 Centre for Experimental Social Sciences (CESS) Nuffield - FLAME University 
 is pleased to host Dr. Manoj Mohanan, Associate Professor at the Sanford Sc
 hool of Public Policy at Duke University. Dr Mohanan will be giving a talk 
 titled “Different Strokes for Different Folks: Incentive Contract Structure
  and Performance of Healthcare Providers".</p><p><strong>Abstract:</strong>
 <br />A central issue in designing performance incentive contracts is wheth
 er to reward the production of outputs versus the use of inputs: the former
  rewards efficiency and innovation in production, while the latter imposes 
 less risk on agents. Agents with varying levels of skill may perform better
  under different contracts as well – more skilled workers may be better abl
 e to innovate, for example. We study these issues empirically through an ex
 periment enabling us to observe and verify outputs (health outcomes) and in
 puts (adherence to recommended medical treatment) in Indian maternity care.
  We find that both output and input incentive contracts achieved comparable
  reductions in post-partum hemorrhage rates, the dimension of maternity car
 e most sensitive to provider behaviour and the largest cause of maternal mo
 rtality. Interestingly, and in line with theory, providers with advanced qu
 alifications performed better and used new strategies under output incentiv
 es, while under input incentives, providers with and without advanced quali
 fications performed equally.</p><p><strong>Bio:</strong><br />As an applied
  microeconomist working in health policy/global health, Dr. Mohanan's resea
 rch focuses on topics including: performance-based contracts, measurement o
 f provider quality and performance, social franchising and social accountab
 ility/monitoring. He also studies the role of subjective expectations/belie
 fs in healthcare behaviour.<br />Several of these projects feature field ex
 periments and policy interventions/evaluations. He is currently working on 
 research projects in India, Kenya and China.</p>
DTSTAMP:20261012T070703
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20191004T141000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20191004T151500
SEQUENCE:0
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